ABSTRACT
Bayesian inference, hierarchical Bayes, informative priors, uncertainty, natural resource methods that don't fit into these two categories include machine-learning methods (Hastie et al. 59 2001) such as maximum entropy modeling (Phillips et al. 2006 ) and Random Forests (Breiman 60 2001). In this essay we focus on how Bayesian methods differ from classical methods, why Dr. The basic concept of the Bayesian approach is simple: after collecting data, we combine However, rejection of the null hypothesis does not provide support for an alternative, nor does 80 failure to reject the null hypothesis mean that it is true. In contrast, the Bayesian framework 81 allows a hypothesis to be supported (or not), and the degree of support to be sequentially 82 updated, through Bayes' formula, as more data become available. Bayes' formula is based on 83 the axioms of conditional probability, and is mathematically uncontroversial. Simply put,
84
Bayesian inference just follows the rules of conditional probability. Its adherents see that as its 85 main strength; its detractors, while admitting its mathematical coherence, disagree with its use as 86 a system of inference.
87
Maximum-likelihood and Bayesian methods both use likelihood functions, which 88 describe the relationship between the data (x) and the parameter(s) that generated the data, and given the data and previous knowledge of the parameter values?" The Bayesian answer, the 94 posterior probability distribution P(H|x), is computed via Bayes' formula, 95 P(H|x) ∝ P(H) P(x|H), where P(H) is the prior distribution, representing what is known about the hypothesis 97 (parameters) prior to the data, and P(x|H) is the likelihood. The change between P(H) and P(H|x) 98 can be viewed as the information content of the data (Gelman et al. 2013) , and it can also be 99 viewed as a measure of how much one "learns" by doing an experiment or collecting data 100 (Ellison 1996) .
101
The form of the likelihood function is often determined by the data. For example, the 102 heights or lengths of members of a population may follow a normal or Gaussian distribution with 103 parameters μ and σ 2 that describe the mean and variance of the distribution. The sexes of 104 individuals in a group could be described with a binomial distribution with parameter θ that 105 describes the probability that an individual is male. The ages or weights of members of a 106 population may have a positively skewed distribution, which could be represented by a 107 lognormal or gamma distribution, again described with mean and variance parameters.
108
The most straightforward example of the concept of updating occurs with time series analyzing the data sequentially agrees with analyzing the data all at once only in a system which 116 follows the rules of conditional probability. Such coherence was one of the reasons that
117
Goodman felt that using Bayesian methods offered the best legitimate inference from available 118 data.
119 120
CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY

121
Probability has been defined as a limiting frequency, which can be called an objectivist or 122 frequentist point of view, but it has also been defined as a degree of belief, which is considered a to 0.5, leading to the conclusion that the probability of heads is one half. Thus the frequency-
133
based definition of probability is framed in terms of a very large number of replications under 134 constant conditions. In practice this is a problem because, unlike simple coin-flipping, we 135 cannot increase our sample size or replicate our experiments until we see a series of numbers 136 converging on a true probability.
137
On the other hand, the view that probability represents a degree of belief which varies 138 from person to person is incompatible with the scientific method. In particular, a personal belief-
139
based view of knowledge is unacceptable for assessing risk and making decisions on issues of 140 public policy. As Goodman put it "Subjective probability can lead to internally consistent 141 systems relating belief and action for a single individual; but severe difficulties emerge in trying to extend this model to justify public decisions. Objective probability represents probability as a 143 literal frequency that can be communicated as a matter of fact and that can be verified by 144 independent observers confronting the same information" (Goodman 2004 assess a bet based on the toss of a fair coin. However, the task of assigning a probability to all 
163
The Bayesian characterization of state of knowledge as a probability is a belief-based should refuse to answer the question, because it is an improper use of "probability." In the 177 classical view, there is no uncertainty: the result is either heads or tails with probability one.
178
Goodman's resolution of objectivist and subjectivist concepts of probability sought to 179 combine the strengths of both approaches. He argued that a Bayesian analysis could fulfill both 180 the belief-based tenet of representing the uncertainty associated with making a decision (i.e.,
181
correctly assessing the risk and placing a rational bet) and a frequency-based definition of 182 probability, because the frequency of interest was not based on hypothetically unlimited 183 replication over the data space but rather on the frequency of estimated parameters in an 184 indefinitely large sample from the prior parameter space (Goodman 2002b (Goodman , 2004 
GOODMAN'S EMPIRICAL APPROACH
262
Goodman sought an approach that combined the mathematical rigor of the Bayesian embrace the paradigm, advocated using all available data, and that included before-the-fact 269 comparative data. This is called an "informative" prior.
270
With a large amount of case-specific data, the likelihood term in Bayes' formula can 
277
Goodman acknowledged, however, that the construction of such a data-based prior was difficult.
278
In the next two sections we discuss construction of data-based priors and give an example based cases within the same dataset or from a meta-analysis of multiple data sets (Myers et al. 2002) .
METHODS FOR INFORMING PRIORS: EXPERT OPINION, EMPIRICAL AND
301
HIERARCHICAL BAYES
306
As the complexity of population models has increased, particularly in fields such as fisheries,
307
some model parameters may not be estimable for data-limited stocks. In these cases, meta- "empirical" in the phrase "empirical Bayes" describes a method and should not be confused with 322 our description of Goodman's "empirical approach". Goodman's use of the term meant that 323 prior information should be based on data rather than a belief system.
324
The fully Bayesian method of informing prior distributions is termed "hierarchical 325
Bayes" (Gelman et al. 2013 ). In a hierarchical Bayes analysis, each hyperparameter is itself drawn from a distribution called the hyperprior (Figure 2 ). The hyperprior is parameterized by 327 fixed values that are generally chosen to give broad coverage across the hyperparameter support.
328
This allows the comparative data, rather than the fixed values chosen for the hyperprior, to cases the use of a well-informed prior was particularly advantageous.
416
Results indicated that while current delineations of critical habitat do encompass areas of 417 high sea lion encounter rates, many high encounter rate areas are not defined as critical habitat 418 (Figure 4) . This analysis provides an excellent example of using empirical Bayes methods to 419 approximate a hierarchical Bayes analysis when computational requirements made the latter 420 intractable. Notably, the large sample size (>18,000 data points) that complicated the use of a 421 hierarchical analysis also made results of the empirical analysis robust to using both the case-422 specific data and the comparative data in estimating the gamma hyperparameters. In other 423 words, the contribution of the encounter rate observed in any particular cell to the prior 424 distribution would be negligible given that the prior was determined by >18,000 values. In 
CONCLUSIONS
433
In this document we, as Dr. Goodman 
